5. Recommends the continued implementation of the Statute of the Institute;

6. Invites the Director of the Institute and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to continue to report annually to the General Assembly on the activities conducted by the Institute;

7. Requests the Institute to prepare, with the assistance of independent experts, a research report on the economic aspects of disarmament and to report to the General Assembly, through the Secretary-General, at its forty-seventh session, the costs of this research project being shared between the regular budget of the United Nations and voluntary contributions.

54th plenary meeting 4 December 1990

45/63. Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament, the latest of which is resolution 44/121 of 15 December 1989,

Recalling its resolution 44/108 of 15 December 1989, in which, inter alia, it called for placing all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East,

Recalling also Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981, in which, inter alia, the Council called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards,

Noting that only Israel has been specifically called upon by the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards,

Noting with grave concern Israel’s persistent refusal to commit itself not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Taking note of resolution GC (XXXIV)/RES/526, adopted on 21 September 1990 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Taking into consideration the final document on international security and disarmament adopted by the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, in paragraph 12 of which Israel was condemned for continuing to develop its nuclear military programmes and weapons of mass destruction and for its refusal to implement the resolutions of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard,

Deeply alarmed by the information with regard to the continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and its testing of their delivery systems in the Mediterranean, thus threatening the peace and security of the region,

Aware of the grave consequences that endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel’s development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and Israel’s collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Deeply concerned that Israel has not committed itself to refrain from attacking or threatening to attack safeguarded nuclear facilities,

1. Reiterates its condemnation of Israel’s refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons;

2. Reiterates also its condemnation of the co-operation between Israel and South Africa in the military field;

3. Expresses its deep concern regarding the information on Israel’s continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and testing of their delivery systems;

4. Reaffirms that Israel should promptly apply Security Council resolution 487 (1981), in which the Council, inter alia, requested it to place all nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities;

5. Calls upon all States and organizations that have not yet done so not to co-operate with or give assistance to Israel that could enhance its nuclear-weapons capability;

6. Requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to inform the Secretary-General of any steps Israel may take to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely Israel’s nuclear activities and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled “Israeli nuclear armament”.

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45/64. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,


Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, ten years ago, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that general agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General, 83

1. Notes with satisfaction that an increasing number of States have either signed, ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981;

2. Also notes with satisfaction that, consequent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983;

3. Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence;

4. Stresses that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols;

5. Requests the Secretary-General as depositary of the Convention and its three annexed Protocols to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

54th plenary meeting 4 December 1990

45/65. Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 O of 16 December 1985, 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986, 42/42 F of 30 November 1987 and 43/81 B of 7 December 1988,

Undertaking the important role that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has to play in the sphere of disarmament,

Recalling also that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that, consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament,

Noting that the critical importance of verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements is universally recognized,

Stressing that the issue of verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements is a matter of concern to all nations,

Recognizing that the United Nations, in accordance with its role and responsibilities established under the Charter, can make a significant contribution in the field of verification, in particular of multilateral agreements,

Reiterating its view that:

(a) Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate and effective measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and to ensure that they are being observed by all parties;

(b) The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement;

(c) Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process;

(d) Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed,

Recalling that:

(a) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field should be considered;

(b) Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not interfere unduly with the internal affairs of States parties or other States or jeopardize their economic, technological and social development,

Taking note of all proposals that had been put forward in the field of verification by Member States, 84 including those by Canada and the Netherlands, France and the countries of the Six-Nation Initiative, 85

Affirming its support for the sixteen principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission, 86

Noting that recent developments in international relations have underscored the importance of effective verification of existing and future arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

Recalling that by resolution 43/81 B it requested the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification that would:

(a) Identify and review existing activities of the United Nations in the field of verification of arms limitation and disarmament;

83 A/43/589.

84 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 60 (para. 6, sect. III.2, of the quoted text).

85 Ibid., para. 60 (para. 6, sect. 1, of the quoted text).