Pakistan’s principled views on a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) are based on the following considerations.

First, and foremost, the treaty should provide equal and undiminished security for all states. As recognized by the Final Document of the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to nuclear disarmament, SSOD-I of 1978, in the adoption of disarmament measures, the right of each state to security should be kept in mind and at each stage of the disarmament process the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. A treaty which overlooks or circumscribes the security of any state wouldn’t work and cannot be negotiated.

Second, the treaty should make a genuine contribution towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and not merely be a non-proliferation instrument.

Third, in addition to a ban on future production, the treaty must also cover the past production or existing stockpiles of fissile materials, in order to address the asymmetries in fissile material holdings at the regional and global levels.

Fourth, the treaty should neither discriminate between the different nuclear weapon states, nor between the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. All states parties should assume equal obligations without any preferential treatment for any category of states.

Fifth, in order to be effective, the treaty should be free of any loopholes by encompassing all types and sources of fissile materials that can be used in nuclear weapons.

Sixth, in order to be credible, the treaty should provide a robust verification mechanism entrusted to a representative and independent treaty body.

Seventh, the treaty should promote both regional and global stability and enhance confidence among states parties.

Eighth, the treaty should not affect the inalienable right of all states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, it should include effective verification measures to safeguard against any misuse or diversion of peaceful use technology and nuclear materials to prohibited purposes.

Lastly, the treaty should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament which is the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The CD strictly operates under the consensus rule to allow each member state to safeguard its vital security interests. A treaty that is negotiated outside this body will lack legitimacy and ownership. Same is the case for any pseudo progress through UNGA-led divisive processes that do not involve all stakeholders, such as a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) or any variant thereof.