

## Canada

### Statement to the Conference on Disarmament

5 February 2019

Mr. President,

We appreciate your sincere efforts to re-invigorate the 2019 session of the Conference on Disarmament through an ambitious and wide-ranging program of work. On balance, we recognize that finding agreement in the Conference on what item or items to begin negotiations on is challenging. As it stands, the draft program appears to propose multiple negotiations at the same time. For Canada this raises concerns about whether all these items are ready for negotiation. There is also a capacity issue that many delegations, including my own, would encounter if negotiations were launched on more than one agenda item. This alone leads us to be cautious about the ambition of the draft program of work.

On the content of the draft program, and our perception of what holds the most promise for negotiation, we offer the following observations:

- As was noted last week, 6 (b) “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, should encompass fissile material as this has been the past understanding in the Conference, and most recently in the work of Subsidiary Body Two.
  - We support the start of negotiations in the Conference of a treaty on a **ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons** and other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) that would be universal, effectively verifiable and non-discriminatory.
  - While this treaty could be framed in terms of the mandate contained in CD1299, we are flexible on this matter, if the negotiation takes place in the Conference.
  - Even if negotiations were to proceed on the basis of CD1299, it has been our position that CD1299 does not preclude the inclusion of negotiations on past production of fissile material.
  - In undertaking a possible treaty negotiation, we believe the recent report of the High-level FMCT expert preparatory group would be a valuable aid to negotiators in the Conference as it provides a range of potential treaty elements.
  - We remain of the belief that an FMCT is the one agenda item most ready for negotiation in terms of the substance, and that, with political will on all sides, and I stress on all sides, not just one, such negotiations could be initiated without delay.
- 
- Regarding 6 (c), “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (PAROS), Canada shares with many delegations the importance of preventing such an arms race. For this reason we were pleased to have been invited to participate in the GGE mandated by the First Committee on this subject and chaired by our colleague Ambassador Patriota.

- We believe that the GGE has to-date made valuable headway in fleshing out areas of concern and commonality regarding further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
- On that basis, Canada prefers to see the work of the GGE concluded before new consideration is given within the Conference to commencing negotiations on PAROS.
- We would, however, welcome further discussion in this forum on PAROS building on the report of Subsidiary Body Three last year.

Quant aux points 6 (a), « Cessation de la course aux armements nucléaires et au désarmement nucléaire », et 6 (d), « Arrangements internationaux efficaces pour garantir les États non dotés d'armes nucléaires contre l'emploi ou la menace de ces armes », suivant les discussions de l'organe subsidiaire en 2018, nous constatons que malgré l'importance de ces points, aucun consensus n'a été atteint quant au lancement des négociations et qu'il faut plus de temps pour combler les écarts nationaux.

Par conséquent, nous serions favorables à la tenue d'une discussion plus approfondie sur ces points en 2019.

Dans cette optique, pour ce qui est du point 6 (f), « Programme global de désarmement », nous serions favorables à la création d'un groupe de travail ou d'un autre organe en vue de poursuivre les discussions sur ce point. Nous sommes ouverts quant aux questions qui pourraient être abordées.

En ce qui concerne le point 6 (g), « Transparence dans le domaine des armements », comme plusieurs délégations l'ont fait observer la semaine dernière, bien que cette question ait fait partie des discussions du cinquième organe subsidiaire, nous ne nous sommes pas entendus sur les concepts de base et nous croyons que cette question ne sera prête pour la négociation que lorsque plus d'éclaircissements seront apportés.

- Finally, on 6 (e) "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" while Subsidiary Body Five did explore issues of relevance to this agenda item, there was no agreement on pursuing negotiations.
- Further, 6 (e) focuses on bio-security and Canada believes that in this area the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention would be the better venue for further action.

Thank you.