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Open-ended informal consultative meeting on FMCT

**Statement of H.E. Mr. Sabri Boukadoum
Ambassador, Permanent Representative**

New York, 2 March 2017

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Madame Chair,

I would like to congratulate you for your designation as Chair of the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) Preparatory Expert Group, and thank you for your opening remarks and those made by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Kim Won-Soo.

Madame Chair,

We have duly taken note of the conclusions and recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts established by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/53, and contained in the document A/70/81.

To us this open-ended informal consultative meeting on FMCT, extremely important, and I would like to seize this opportunity to share with you some general thoughts at this stage.

- 1- The treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be based on the parameters defined in resolution 48/75 L and the elements identified in the Shannon report (CD/1299), namely, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty.
- 2- This instrument should ban the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and serve as a framework to reduce and eliminate stockpiles of such material.
- 3- The treaty should not be interpreted as infringing the inalienable right of States parties to pursue research on and the production peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination, I mean for civilian purposes.
- 4- The treaty should ban the future production of fissile material used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (clearly by material we mean highly enriched uranium and plutonium); the diversion of fissile material to purposes that are prohibited or contrary to the treaty objectives; the reactivation of decommissioned, dismantled or converted nuclear facilities for activities banned by the treaty; and the transfer of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons to other States or entities. It should also require States parties to decommission, dismantle and convert facilities that produce fissile material covered by the treaty and to reduce and eliminate their stockpiles of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons before the treaty enters into force.

The definitions of nuclear material contained in article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could provide a sound basis for the treaty, with adjustments to be made whenever necessary.

- 5- The treaty should be underpinned by a rigorous and effective verification regime able to provide the necessary assurances of compliance with its provisions. To that end, the scope of the verification regime should be broad enough to cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle. It could be based on the comprehensive IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) that apply to non-nuclear-weapon States, and all military and civil nuclear activities during processing, use and storage should be placed under this regime.

By virtue of its mandate and experience, we see IAEA as the appropriate agency to verify compliance with the treaty.

An effective safeguards regime requires that a sufficient amount of information and detailed inventories on the production, volume of fissile material stock for civil and military purposes, and data on civil and military nuclear facilities be made available. The treaty should include measures to be invoked in the event of violations that entail non-compliance with fundamental treaty obligations, and measures to correct those situations and to resolve disputes that may arise among States parties concerning the application or interpretation of its provisions.

The duration of the treaty should be indefinite and should not be subject to reservations, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations would be ideally the depositary of the treaty.

Let me say that we see as multiple parallel courses to be followed for the work to be done in the endeavor of the legally binding-instrument to ban nuclear weapons. These are parallel courses. However they look at each other and might influence each other pace hopefully positively.

Finally, I would like to underline that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum of negotiations for the FMCT.

We view the FMCT as an essential contribution and step towards to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and we remain committed to working actively and constructively during our deliberations.

I thank you