

**Informal Consultative Meeting by the Chairperson of the  
High-level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group  
(New York, 2-3 March 2017)**

**Interactive Discussion  
on  
Definitions and Verification  
Statement by Pakistan Delegation**

Madam Chairperson,

Before delving into the elaboration of our comments on definitions and verification of a Fissile Material Treaty, FMT, let me emphasize that our views on the different aspects of the treaty are without prejudice to our objections to the fundamental nature of a cut-off only treaty – the views we have expressed in the first session in our general statement. Our comments on specific treaty elements should be seen in the context of an FMT, and not FMCT.

Pakistan's views on these issues are also contained in the document A/71/140/Rev.1/add.1 which had been submitted pursuant to OP-3 of UNGA resolution 70/39 (of December 2015). Our general views on definitions and verification of a Fissile Material Treaty have also been touched upon in the working paper submitted by Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament published as a CD document CD/2036.

Regarding the definitions of Fissile Material for the purpose of a **Fissile Material Treaty**, we believe that any fissile material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons should be covered in the definition. Besides enriched uranium and separated plutonium, it should also include neptunium and americium, as well as any other material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, for instance reactor-grade plutonium. The exact isotopic compositions and enrichment levels, etc. could be agreed during treaty negotiations.

The production of fissile material, as defined under the treaty, should be banned for nuclear weapons purposes, and should only be permitted for civilian peaceful purposes and for non-proscribed military activities under strict verification. At the same time, the existing stocks of fissile material should be appropriately covered by the treaty to address the regional and global asymmetries in their national holdings.

As for defining fissile material production, all known processes and pathways for the production of fissile material, such as enrichment and reprocessing, must be covered in the treaty.

The definition of fissile material production facilities should not be limited to enrichment and reprocessing plants only. Any facility that is capable of producing fissile material must come under the treaty's purview.

Such an approach would not only cover all loopholes but would also be non-discriminatory.

## **Verification**

We are of the view that in order to be effective and credible, a Fissile Material treaty should provide for a robust verification mechanism overseen by an independent treaty body that is capable of detecting any non-compliance in a timely manner, without any discrimination between states.

Pakistan would favour a comprehensive approach to verification, whereby all nuclear material and facilities covering the entire fuel cycle, and not just the limited production facilities like enrichment and reprocessing plants, would be subject to verification.

There is neither any insurmountable technical barrier nor any prohibitive financial requirement that would prevent us from pursuing such a comprehensive approach. We should not be distracted or misled by self-serving arguments relying on technical and financial pretexts. Choosing a verification approach is a political decision first and foremost. The technical details can be worked out subsequently.

In the general statement delivered earlier today, I have already outlined Pakistan's preference for also covering the existing stocks of fissile material under a verification regime. The treaty's verification regime should also be capable of verifying both the quantities of declared stocks, as well as the verification of the reduction of fissile material stocks as agreed between the states parties on a regional or global basis.

The verification system should provide timely detection of any diversion or non-compliance. It should also provide credible assurance regarding the absence of any undeclared or clandestine activity involving the production of fissile material for prohibited purposes, including any stocks that are unaccounted for.

Where applicable, the shut-down and dismantlement of facilities such as reprocessing and enrichment plants as well as dedicated plutonium production reactors should also be verified.

The verification obligations under an FMT would mostly apply to the nuclear weapons possessing states. For non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol already provide the desired level of assurance.

The verification tasks under the treaty should be performed by an independent and dedicated treaty body – an FMTO – without excluding the use of IAEA resources. The responsibility to verify and oversee the treaty's implementation cannot be assigned exclusively to the IAEA. Besides the problems arising from differences between the membership of the IAEA and the states parties to the treaty, the Agency's decision making organs and procedures are not inclusive enough to effectively perform the oversight function. The FMTO would need an executive governing body that includes all the major stakeholders on a permanent basis - which is not the case with the IAEA Board of Governors.

Madam Chairperson,

Definitions and verification are closely linked to the treaty's scope. Without developing full clarity and a common vision on the treaty's scope, discussions on definitions and verification seem premature. The complexity of the issues associated with definitions and verification require an inclusive and exhaustive engagement among all the relevant stakeholders. Such discussions therefore should take place in the CD, ideally as part of the negotiation process of an FMT or, in the absence of consensus, through informal discussions in the CD. In our view, the 25-member High Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group is not the right forum for such discussions, especially when the larger issues of scope and treaty objectives remain unresolved, and the Shannon Mandate continues to be questioned as the basis for substantive work. Also, this two-day open-ended meeting cannot substitute the need for a sustained discussion among all relevant states in the relevant forum, i.e. the CD.

I thank you.